

# Discussion of Känzig, Marenz & Olbert “Carbon Leakage to Developing Countries”

by Ralf Martin



All views expressed are the presenter's  
alone

# Background

- Europe has been pushing ahead with climate policy for a number of years
  - ETS + carbon pricing
  - Leakage = it could all be pointless
  - Previous research no strong evidence for leakage
  - Carefully done new piece of work exploiting slightly different variation
- 
- Do we have to change the view?
  - Not so fast

# Context

- Various forms of leakage
- EU producers could lose market share to foreign producers (of emission intensive products)
- Here: MNEs move carbon intensive parts of supply chain to un-regulated countries....we examined same question in:



Journal of Environmental Economics and  
Management  
Volume 112, March 2022, 102601



Searching for carbon leaks in multinational  
companies ☆

Antoine Dechezleprêtre<sup>a</sup>, Caterina Gennaioli<sup>b</sup>, Ralf Martin<sup>c d e</sup>,  
Mirabelle Muûls<sup>c d e</sup>, Thomas Stoerk<sup>a f</sup>

&

JOURNAL ARTICLE CORRECTED PROOF

Does Pricing Carbon Mitigate Climate Change?  
Firm-Level Evidence from the European Union  
Emissions Trading System

Jonathan Colmer, Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls, Ulrich J Wagner Author Notes

*The Review of Economic Studies*, rdae055, <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae055>

- **No net leakage:** EU reduction bigger than RoW increase
- Firms invest in carbon reducing equipment in Europe

# A brief theory of MNE carbon leaks (and halos)

- MNE produces final product  $Q = CES(K_{EU}, K_{RoW})$

Spillover to RoW carbon intensity


- $K_{EU}$  &  $K_{RoW}$  are not perfect substitutes

- EU introduces carbon tax/price  $\tau$

Shift (some) production to RoW

- MNE choice:

Invest in carbon reducing technology (including organizational capital; e.g. climate change manager )



# What exactly happens is highly non-linear in price

Fig. 1. Marginal profits for different parameter values. Notes: Visualization of profit equation for various parameter assumptions.




Fig. 2. Abatement and row emissions for different carbon prices.

Notes: Visualizations of the optimal amount of abatement effort and RoW emissions for different levels of EU carbon prices from simulations. Elasticity of substitution  $\gamma = 2.25$ . Elasticity of demand  $\eta = 2$ .

# Reconciling Känzig et al with Martin et al

- Time
- Sample

Time

Suggestion: explore non linear price response?

Reconciling	
Kaenzig et al	Martin et al
2010-2019	<2015
Carbon tax increases of up to 40 Euro	Smaller carbon price (<20 Euro)


Different time period with higher impact carbon price?

# Reconciling Känzig et al with Martin et al

- Time/Level of price change
- Sample

Suggestion: might be cleaner to work with non ETS sample throughout

Sample



Effect of carbon tax

Effect of ETS

# Does it make sense to have more leakage in the non ETS sector?

## **No**

- Less carbon intensive

## **Yes**

- Plenty of free permits in our sample period
- Less pass through?



Something to explore



# Other issues

- Measurement: Do we really have carbon at 0.1 degree grid cell?

3. Spatial allocation of emissions on 0.1 degree by 0.1degree grid cells.

A geographical database was built using spatial proxy datasets with the location of energy and manufacturing facilities, road networks, shipping routes, human and animal population density and agricultural land use, that vary over time. The input datasets were point, line and area grids at various resolutions and using GIS techniques for conversion, resampling and

aggregation the dataset have been included on a  $0.1^{\circ} \times 0.1^{\circ}$  grid. National sector totals are then distributed with the given percentages of the spatial proxies over the country's area.

Maybe not?  
Does this mean  
time variation is  
entirely driven by  
aggregate  
variation?

# Other remarks


- Align EU subsidiary & Africa RoW subsidiary
- Try to get estimates of emission reduction in Europe and how it compares to increases elsewhere

Noise in Consolidated results might hide net CO2 savings


Panel B	ln(Scope 1 Emissions)	ln(Scope 1+2 Emissions)	ln(Scope 1 Em. Intensity)
Carbon Policy Exp. (FTanA)	-0.0124 (0.0785)	-0.0483 (0.0690)	-0.0545 (0.0727)
Obs.	1,906	1,906	1,906
Adj. R2	0.955	0.961	0.929
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Other controls at EU country level

(i) Grid Size: 0.1



Carbon tax introduced 2014 but increases only in 2017/18 to 40 Euro  
Also in 2017: new government



$$Other\ drivers\ In\ EU\ countries = \sum_{d \in D} w_{id} \times Other_{dt}$$



- Thanks for an interesting paper
- Reconciliation is possible!

[r.martin@imperial.ac.uk](mailto:r.martin@imperial.ac.uk)

**Table 8: CARBON LEAKAGE TO LOWER-INCOME COUNTRIES AT THE MACRO LEVEL**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	ln(CO2 Country)				
Sample:	Full	Full	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Low Income
Carbon Policy Exp. (Macro, Trade)	0.025 (0.02)	0.026 (0.02)	0.007 (0.08)	-0.003 (0.05)	0.045*** (0.01)
ln(GDP)	0.610*** (0.12)	0.625*** (0.14)	0.791*** (0.13)	0.191 (0.22)	0.323** (0.15)
GDP Growth	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
ln(Exports)	0.053** (0.03)	0.077*** (0.03)	0.034 (0.08)	0.009 (0.03)	0.113*** (0.04)
ln(Population)	0.229 (0.18)	0.149 (0.24)	-0.222 (0.42)	0.188 (0.45)	-0.440 (0.38)
Obs.	1105	1095	367	436	185
Adj. R2	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.995
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes				
Year × Region FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

**Table 7: THE EFFECT ON EMISSIONS AND ACTIVITY AT THE CONSOLIDATED LEVEL**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>	ln(Fixed Tan. Assets)	ln(Total Assets)	ln(Employees)
Carbon Policy Exp. (FTanA)	-0.0199 (0.0262)	-0.0050 (0.0202)	-0.0052 (0.0242)
Obs.	6,006	6,041	5,665
Adj. R2	0.959	0.978	0.954
<b>Panel B</b>	ln(Scope 1 Emissions)	ln(Scope 1+2 Emissions)	ln(Scope 1 Em. Intensity)
Carbon Policy Exp. (FTanA)	-0.0124 (0.0785)	-0.0483 (0.0690)	-0.0545 (0.0727)
Obs.	1,906	1,906	1,906
Adj. R2	0.955	0.961	0.929
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes